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BAR BRIEFS

(Continued from page one)
There are few callings more potentially constructive; that offer better
opportunities for great social service - and at a time when the world so
greatly needs it - than the law.
On the base of the Gambetta monument in Paris is chiseled the legend;
"No one can forbid us the future." So the hour is yours to plot the course
of the coming years as you wish it to be and, through the possibilities and
opportunities of a great profession, to strive to make your ideal an actuality
for better or for worse. The wish is the reality; in the thought the whole
of your future is latent. Your individual responsibility for results is thus
implied. In these times and their hard exactions the currency of materialistic
ideas and false standards will impose a heavy tax upon your perservance.
But as thoughts triumph over matter, so will the ideals cherished in the
center of your hearts triumph in the end over those hours of discouragement and moments of doubt which paralyze effort with .whispers of futility.
May you thru your efforts serve your God, your country and your
profession.
M. L. McBRIDE
Secretary.

OUR SUPREME COURT HOLDS
In Northern States Power Company, Respt., vs. Board of Railroad Commissioners, et al, Applts.
That the fair value upon which a utility is entitled to earn a return is
the reasonable value of its property used and useful for the service of the
public at the time it is being so used.
That in determining fair value allowance must be made for the increase
or decrease in value of the utility's property from its original cost, unless
the allowance of the increase will result in a rate which would be unfair to
the public.
That in finding fair value, the weight to be given to evidence of historical cost and reconstruction cost depreciated and other evidence must be determined in the light of the facts of the case under investigation.
That'a rule or precedent which requires that evidence of historical cost
be given predominating weight in every case is arbitrary.
That where the undisputed evidence of reproduction cost disclosed a substantial increase in the value of the utility's property over its original cost, it
was the duty of the Board of Railroad Commissioners to give consideration
and effect to that evidence as a major factor in reaching its finding of fair
value.
That going concern value is a property right which should be considered
in a valuation of a utility's property for rate making purposes.
That going concern value as defined in rate cases does not include either
good will or franchise values.
That Section 4609c37, Supplement to the Comp. Laws of N. D. 1913, does
not prohibit a consideration and allowance of going concern value In computing a utility's rate base.
That a utility plant which has a history of continuous profitable operation over a long period of years has a going concern value.
That the fact that the depreciation of a utility's property was computed
upon the basis of its actual physical condition, rather than upon a salvage
basis, may not be construed as an allowance of going concern value.
That where the evidence showed that a utility had a history of continuous
profitable operation, it was the Commission's duty to consider and allow going concern value in determining the fair value of the utility's property.
That under the provisions of section 4609c42 Supplement to Comp. Laws
1913, the Board of Railroad Commissioners is required to make a finding of
fact setting forth the amount at which going concern valu6 has been allowed.
That in making allowances for operating costs or expenses, it was the
duty of the Board of Railroad Commissioners to allow such amounts as in its
judgment were necessary, but the judgment which the Commission must

BAR BRIEFS

153

exercise is a judgment based upon the evidence, it may not disregard the
undisputed evidence of actual expenditures and substitute therefor its opinion of what the expenditures for any specific purpose ought to be.
That where the undisputed evidence disclosed that a utility had expended $8,476.01 for legal services during the year immediately preceeding the inquiry and there was no evidence tending to show that such expenditures were
wasteful or extraordinary or that such services would cost less in the future,
an annual allowance of $3,000 for attorney fees was too great a departure
from the unchallenged proof to be accounted for as a reasonable exercise of
the Commission's judgment.
That where the evidence showed an itemized list of dues and donations
totaling $4,638.94 which the utility had paid out during the year immediately
preceeding the inquiry, a finding that some but not all of such dues and donations were properly chargeable to operating expenses without specifying
which were proper and which were not, and an allowance of $3,000 for all the
purposes listed, was, in the absence of any claim of bad faith or that the
expenditure for any particular purpose was excessive, an attempt to control
the management of the utility and beyond the powers of the Board of Railroad Commissioners.
That in its investigation of a utility for the purpose of establishing a rate
base the Board of Railroad Commissioners is required to make findings of
fact upon all matters which have a bearing upon the rates which a utility
will be permitted to charge.
That the findings of fact of the Commission upon all material matters
must be sufficiently definite to enable a reviewing court to determine if such
findings were supported by any evidence and afforded a reasonable basis for
the decision.
That a "lump sum" allowance for operating costs at a figure substantially
less than the amount which the utility claimed and offered evidence to prove
was necessary, made upon findings which did not disclose the extent to which
the utility's specific claims had been allowed, reduced or rejected was made
upon insufficient findings of fact.
Appeal from the District Court of Cass County, Hon. Daniel B. Holt, Judge.
REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. Christianson, J. dissenting.
In H. W. Lyons, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Otter Tail Power Company, Deft.
and Applt.
That Section 4609c16, Supplement to the Compiled Laws of North Dakota 1913, which provides that no agreement for service made by a public
utility with its -customers shall be lawful unless and until the same shall be
filed with and approved by the Commissioners (Board of Railroad Commissioners now Public Service Commission) applies to agreements with persons
who had previously been customers.
That a plaintiff, who innocently entered into and performed an agreement made in violation of a statutory provision which was enacted for the
benefit of a class to which plaintiff belonged and for the regulation of a
class to which plaintiff belonged, was not in pari delicto with the defendant.
That a cause of action for the rescission of a contract is stated where
under the facts alleged in the complaint the contract is unlawful for causes
not apparent on its face and plaintiff is not equally in fault with the defendant (Section 7206, Compiled Laws of North Dakota 1913.)
That in an action brought by plaintiff for the rescission of an unlawful
contract and for restitution of benefits conferred on defendant in the performance thereof, the fact that plaintiff cannot restore the benefits received
by him as a result of defendant's performance will not bar restitution to the
extent that the benefits conferred on defendant may exceed those received
by plaintiff.
Appeal from the District Court of Stutsman County, Hon. Fred Jansonius, Judge.
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AFFIRMED.
J. dissenting.

BAR BRIEFS
Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. Burr and Christianson,

In Thomas Ryan, Petr., vs. 0. J. Nygaard, as Warden of the North Dakota State Penitentiary, Respt.
That on habeas corpus the inquiry is limited to questions of jurisdiction.
The writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a substitute for appeal or writ
of error to obtain a review of the correctness of the acts of a court that was
acting within its jurisdiction.
That jurisdiction is the power to hear and determine. The existence of
such power does not depend upon the correctness of the decision made; for
a court, having jurisdiction of a cause and of the parties and general power
to render the particular order or judgment that is challenged, does not lose
jurisdiction because it makes a mistake in determining either the facts or
the law, or both.
That a court having jurisdiction of the offense charged, and of the party
who is charged with its commission has jurisdiction to determine whether
that offense is sufficiently charged in the indictment or information.
That Chapter 126, Laws 1927, which provides for increased punishment
for persons convicted of a felony in this state who have been convicted of
two or more felonies in this or any other state in the United States, construed, and it is held:
That an information may be filed thereunder "if at any time before
judgment and sentence, or at any time after judgment and sentence but before such judgment and sentence is fully executed, it shall appear that one
convicted of a felony, has been previously convicted" or two or more felonies
that fall within the purview of said Chapter.
That prosecution may be instituted and conducted under said Chapter
only after a conviction for a felony. It is not contemplated that the fact of
the former convictions shall be set forth in the information charging the
commission of the crime for which the increased punishment is sought to be
invoked.
That-the procedure prescribed by said Chapter 126 is precisely the same
where a person previously has been convicted of two felonies and it is sought
to subject him to the increased punishment prescribed by Section 1 of the
said Chapter, as where a person has been convicted three or more times of
felonies and it is sought to subject him to the increased punishment prescribed by Section 2 of said Chapter.
That a District Court has jurisdiction of a prosecution under said Chapter
126, Laws 1927, after a conviction for a felony, (1) either before judgment and
sentence, or (2) at any time after judgment and sentence, but before the
judgment and sentence is fully executed.
That where an Information under said Chapter 126 is presented after
judgment and sentence, but before judgment and sentence is fully executed,
it is a question for the court to determine whether the information Is sufficient, and the court has jurisdiction to determine the questions of law and
fact that may arise in the course of the action.
That for reasons stated in the opinion, it is held that the record affirmatively discloses that the petitioner was not deprived of any legal right, either
statutory or constitutional, but that he was afforded a fair trial according to
the law of the land and that he is legally detained in custody by virtue of a
final judgment of a competent court of criminal jurisdiction.
Original application for a Writ of Habeas Corpus by Thomas Ryan.
WRIT DENIED. Opinion of the Court by Christianson, J. Burr, Ch. J., concurrs specially.
In Florence Bagg, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Otter Tail Power Company, a corporation, Deft. and Applt.
That under the law of this state, a party to an action has the right to request the court, in writing, to give such instructions to the jury as the party
may deem proper and necessary, and these requested instructions should be
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given without modification or change when they contain proper statements
of the law and deal with the issues before the jury, unless the equivalent to
these instructions is fairly and properly stated and given to the jury by the
court in its charge.
That it was not error for the trial court to refuse to give the instructions
requested by appellant, as the written charge given to the jury covered all
of the issues in the case, all proper matter embraced in the requests, and
fully and fairly stated the law governing the questions to be determined.
That the defense of contributory negligence is an affirmative defense and
presupposes negligence on the part of the defendant.
That even though the defendant is shown to have been guilty of negligence, no recovery can be had by plaintiff when the injury is due to the
negligence of both parties.
That negligence, whether contributory or primary, is a question of fact,
never of law, unless the established or conceded facts from which the inference must be drawn admit of but one conclusion by reasonable men.
That the standard to be used in determining whether or not plaintiff has
been guilty of such contributory negligence as will defeat recovery is whether
the actions of the plaintiff were those of an ordinary prudent person under
the same circumstances and in -the same position.
That record examined and it is held: it was the duty of the court to submit to the jury the question of whether the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence, and that there was sufficient evidence from which the jury
could find plaintiff was not guilty of such contributory negligence as precluded recovery.
Appeal from the District Court of Richland County, Hon. Wm. H. Hutchinson, Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In the State of North Dakota, Respt., vs. Lois Green, Applt.
That a prostitute who pays over to a third person her proceeds or earnings is not an accomplice of the one who receives such proceeds or earnings
in violation of Section 9643; Comp. Laws N. D. 1913.
That one charged with knowingly receiving proceeds or earnings of a
woman engaged in prostitution is not engaged in a joint enterprise with the
prostitute so as to constitute both parties principals.
That in a prosecution for knowingly accepting or receiving maintenance
or revenue from the proceedings or earnings of a woman engaged in prostitution, it is error to admit evidence of the reputation of the defendant's house
in which the prostitution was alleged to have been carried on.
That Section 9643, Comp. Laws N. D. 1913, was not repealed -by the enactment of Chapter 190, Session Laws N. D. 1919 (Section 9643al to 9643a6,
Supp. to Comp. Laws).
Appeal from the District Court of Ramsey County, Hon. G. Grimson,
Judge. REVERSED AND NEW TRIAL GRANTED. Opinion of the Court
by Morris, J. Burr, Ch. J., dissenting.
In Clifton L. Voss, individually and doing business as Voss Studio, Pltf.
and Respt., vs.. John Gray, as Tax Commissioner of the State of North Dakota, Deft. and Applt.
That a photographer who for a consideration makes photographs on their
order for patrons who sit for them is the owner of and has title to such photographs until they are accepted and delivered.
That photographs are tangible personal property and when made and
delivered for a consideration on the order of the person who sits for them,
there is a sale subject to the tax imposed -by the Sales Tax Act, chapter 249,
Session Laws 1937. Appeal from Cass County, Hon. Daniel B. Rolt, J.
Christianson, J. disREVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J.
senting.
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In Fred Rott, Pltf. and Respt., vs. Provident Life Insurance Company,
Deft. and Applt.
That under the facts in this case it is held that a re-instatement of a
life insurance policy in an amount equal to one-half of the original accompanied by a receipt and note regarding premium, does not constitute a new
contract-the receipt and note constituting merely evidence bearing on the
payment of premiums under the re-instated policy.
That in such case it is not error to admit oral testimony regarding the
payments of premiums prior to re-instatement.
That where there is evidence in the record from which reasonable men
can draw the inference necessary to support the verdict, especially when three
juries and three District Judges have found that same verdict, the Supreme
Court will not set aside such verdict on the ground of the insufficiency of
the evidence. Appeal from the District Court of Hettinger County, Hon.
John Lowe, Spec. Judge. AFFIRMED. Opinion by District Court Judge G.
Grimson, sitting for Nuessle, J. disq. Burke, J. concurring specially, Burr.
Ch. J. dissenting.
In Village of Dazey, a public corporation, Pltfs. and Applts., vs. Barnes
County, a public corporation, et al., Defts. and Respts.
That where real property has been sold to a county at tax sale, the county
may, for the sake of economy, expedition and clarity of title, perfect its title
to the property by acquiring a quit claim deed from the record owner in lieu
of giving the statutory notice of expiration of redemption and securing a tax
deed.
That where a county procures the quit claim deed of the record owner
to perfect the title to property previously sold to it at tax sale, such property
is acquired through tax proceedings and when resold, the statutory method
for the sale of property so acquired must be followed.
That property acquired through tax iproceedings must be resold according to the provisions of section 2202 Compiled Laws of North Dakota 1913,
as amended by chapter 235, Laws of North Dakota 1939, and unless so sold,
the sale is void.
That-a village has a sufficient interest in property acquired by a county
through tax sale proceedings, to maintain an action to set aside a void sale
of such property where the amount to be realized from such sale is far less
than the property's actual value and greatly inadequate to pay the village's
share of delinquent taxes levied against the property.
That where a building in which a village has a special interest, by virtue
of village taxes levied against it, is about to be removed from the village by
a party who claims ownership through a void sale of a county tax title, injunction is the appropriate remedy to prevent the removal.
Appeal from the District Court of Barnes County, Hon. M. J. Englert,
Judge. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J. REVERSED.
In George B. McMillen, Administrator, Pltf., Applt., Respt., vs. Paris E.
Chamberland and William B. Chamberland, Defts., Respts., Applts.
That an instrument in writing is presumed to be truly dated, unless contradicted.
That where the certificate of acknowledgment on a deed is regular on its
face, such certificate is presumed to state the truth.
That a grant duly executed is presumed to have been delivered at its
date.
That the execution of a warranty deed being admitted, delivery thereof
can not be made conditionally. If a delivery be shown, such delivery discharges any condition which may have been attached, and the delivery is
necessarily absolute.
That the record showing that a duly executed warranty deed, dated and
acknowledged October 29, 1921, was handed by the grantor in the presence of
witnesses to one of the grantees, who handed it to the other grantee, and the
grantees thereafter delivered the deed to a third party, who kept it among
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his private papers, but in an envelope endorsed with the names of the grantees, indicating the contents of the envelope to be the property of the grantees, it is held upon all of the evidence in the case that the warranty deed
was delivered by the grantor to the grantees on October 29, 1921, even though
such deed did not again come into the physical possession of the grantees
and was not recorded until after the death of the grantor.
That where, in the trial of an action to quiet title to real estate, the court
proceeds to adjudicate and determine the rights of a stranger to the case,
to the detriment of the rights of the appellants, such adjudication will be set
aside, leaving undetermined any conflicting rights of said stranger and appellants.
Appeal from the District Court of Williams County, Hon. A- J. Gronna, J.
MODIFIED AND A-FIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In L. E. Boe, et al, Clmts. and Respts., vs. Workmen's Compensation
Bureau, Deft. and Applt.
That where the Workmen's Compensation Bureau Idenies the right of a
claimant to share in the compensation fund, and upon appeal to the district
court the decision of the bureau is affirmed, the unsuccessful claimant is not
entiled to have an attorney's fee taxed as costs against the bureau, even
though the proceedings may have -been prosecuted in good faith.
Appeal from the District Court of Dunn County, Hon. Harvey J. Miller, J.
REVERSED. Opinion of the Court by Burr, Ch. J.
In L, E. O'Connor, Rec., Pltf. and Repst., vs. Allan McManus, Deft. and
Applt, and First Nat. Bank, Grand Forks, Applt.
That an execution may be levied on the contents of a safety deposit box.
That a sheriff may forcibly open a safety deposit box of a judgment
debtor in order to make a levy of an execution issued upon the judgment.
That an order of a court directing a bank which had leased a safety deposit box to a judgment debtor, to open the box by force in order to enable
a sheriff ,to levy an execution upon the contents -thereof, is a proper order
in aid of execution. Appeal from the District Court of Grand Forks County,
Hon. P. G. Swenson, J. AFFIRMED. Opinion of the Court by Burke, J.
In The Mutual Life Insurance of New York, a corporation, Pltf. and
Respt., vs. North Dakota Workmen's Compensation Bureau, Defts. and Applts.
That the relationship of employer and employee must exist in order to
make the provisions of -the Workmen's Compensation Act, (Article Ila of
Chapter 5 of the Political Code, being sections 396al-396a33, 1925 Supplement
to the 1913 Compiled Laws (chapter 162, Session Laws 1919) and acts amendatory thereof) applicable.
That whether the relationship of employer and employee exists so as to
make the provisions of the Workmen's Compensation Act applicable, must be
determined as in other cases.
That the test in determining whether the relationship of employer and
employee exists, is, who has the right of control of the details of the work. If
the person for whom the work is being done has the right of control, whether
he exercises it or not, and is concerned not only with the result but also with
the manner and method of its doing, he is an employer, and the person doing
the work his employee; if he is concerned merely with the result of the work
and has no control over the details of its doing, the person doing the work is
an independent contractor.
That the complaint in the instant case is examined, and it is HELD, for
reasons stated in the opinion, that under the facts alleged the relationship between the plaintiff and its -agents was that of employer and independen contractors.
(Syllabus by the Court)
Appeal from the District Court of Burleigh County, Honorable Fred Jansonius, Judge. Action to recover money paid under protest to the Workmen's
Compensation Bureau. From an order overruling a demurrer to the plaintiff's complaint, the defendants appeal. AFFIRMED.
Opinion of the Court by Nuessle, J.

